not seem bright. Brunei as a candidate, however, seems to have all of the qualifications. Geographically it is part of the Malaysian-Indonesian core area in Southeast Asia. Culturally it is Malay-in Islam, language, and customs. Most importantly, the perception in Indonesia and Malaysia is that regional security and stability require Brunei's incorporation into the ASEAN framework. Brunei's candidate status is primarily a function of political necessity, economic and cultural criteria being secondary.
The country itself is a mini-state with petroleum punch. Once one of the greatest of the archipelago Malay states, Brunei's history from the 17th to the 19th centuries was one of incremental partition until finally, in 1888, the Sultanate, largely confined to its present borders, accepted a British protectorate as the only way to forestall absorption into either Brooke More showy projects include a new stadium, which will hold a quarter of the total population at one seating, and the new royal palace. Brunei's transportation and communications links have been extended with the deep water port at Muara and a new airport, with a 12,000-foot runway, at Bandar Seri Begawan, the capital. Royal Brunei Air operates an expanding number of regional routes with Boeing 737s. By the end of 1983, Brunei, which already has color television, will have a ground station giving it satellite transmission capabilities. Still, Brunei's wealth cannot be absorbed in Brunei and the government runs huge annual surpluses larger than annual expenditures. An international Investment Advisory Board recommends the foreign investment of these surpluses.
Brunei's wealth is the product of the activities of Brunei Shell Petroleum, in which the government of Brunei holds a 50% share of the equity. Since the first well started pumping at the Seria field in 1929, BSP has produced nearly 1.7 million barrels of oil. Its reserves are given as more than 1.6 million barrels.7 At current rates of production of about 180,000 barrels per day, this is more than a twenty-year reserve. Production is below its highest rate of 268,000 b/d in 1979. The cuts resulted in a 27% drop in production between 1980 and 1981. The decision to reduce output seems to have been based on both market considerations (the oil glut) and the government's already existing huge surplus of revenue. Although Brunei by OPEC standards is a fairly small producer (twenty-third in the world), unlike many petroleum states Brunei has no need for current extra income. Many of BSP's offshore fields have natural gas associated with oil, and according to BSP this decade will be dominated by gas interests. The gas from the offshore wells is pumped to the world's largest liquification plant at Lumut, jointly owned by the Brunei government, Brunei Shell, and Mitsubishi. More than five million tons of liquid natural gas (LNG) a year are exported to Japan on a twenty-year contract (through 1992). Brunei is, after Indonesia,Japan's major supplier of natural gas. Brunei's gas reserves are estimated to be 109 cubic feet or an energy equivalent greater than its oil reserves.
In 1980, Brunei's total exports were valued at B $9.7 billion, of which oil and natural gas accounted for 99%. 8 The crude oil exports went to nine customers in the following percentages: Japan (59%); Singapore (10.5%); United States (10.4%); South Africa (7.8%); Thailand (6.4%o); Philippines (1.7%); and Australian and New Zealand each at less than 1%. Although Japan continues to be the largest single importer of Brunei crude, its share has been declining while the ASEAN share has increased. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether eventual ASEAN and U.N. membership will lead to the termination of crude oil sales to South Africa. The value of Brunei's oil exports has tripled since 1978, a function of price increases, not volume. All exported LNG goes toJapan and in 1980 was worth B $3 billion.
Brunei has been running ever-increasing balance-of-trade surpluses despite the necessary importations for the development programs, as Table 1 demonstrates. For the first three quarters of 1981, the surplus was B $800 million less than in the comparable period of 1980. This reflects oil production cutbacks. In 1981, Singapore succeededJapan as Brunei's major import country of origin, followed byJapan, the U.S., and the United Kingdom.
It was the issue of Brunei's wealth in the regional setting that led to the collapse of an earlier decolonization scheme that would have had Brunei -entering the Malaysian Federation with Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. Brunei, aware of the offshore oil and gas potential, did not want to turn over to Kuala Lumpur at the end of a decade the revenue from the exploitation of its mineral resources. It should be remembered that at this time Malaysia's own petroleum resources had yet to be explored, so that the question of the division of revenue between the central government and the state was important. The differences between the parties have been trivialized as a dispute over rank and precedence of the then ruling Brunei Sultan, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, among the Malay potentates. This interpretation can still rouse anger as in late 1981, when Tunku Abdul Rahman, who as the Malaysian Even though money might not be any object in Brunei's security planning, the demographic reality is that there is a very small human pool from which indigenous forces can be drawn. Already the role of women in the defense forces is increasing, but the limits to expansion of personnel given the other claims on the labor force is a real constraint. One partial solution is recruitment of mercenary forces. Today, a substantial part of fixed installation security is provided by a privately recruited force of Gurkhas, freeing the RBMR soldiers for other duties. Also there remains in Brunei some hope that it might still be possible to work out an arrangement that would prolong the presence of the Gurkha battalion or, failing that, to maintain some sort of British defense commitment, at least in a general way. The analogy of the Five Power Defence Agreement comes to mind.
The best guarantee of Brunei's security is to be found in the kind of international order in which it will become independent. Malaysia was not the only interested party in the evolution of Brunei politics. Post-Sukarno Indonesia shuddered at the prospect of any kind of radical regime emerging in Bandar Seri Begawan and was not particularly happy with Kuala Lumpur's backing of the PRB even if Kuala Lumpur thought it could control the outcome. Indonesia would not tolerate any Brunei regime that might become the base for subversive acts against Indonesia. Nor did Indonesia endorse any kind of Malaysian federation solution to the decolonization questionJakarta made it clear to Malaysia at an informal Heads-of-Government meeting at Labuan in May 1978 that Indonesia wanted Brunei to be discussed first in the context of regional security and stability. Although Indonesia denies any desire to interfere in Bruneian affairs, Indonesia nevertheless claims to be one of the countries responsible for security in the ASEAN area, including Brunei. In this role Jakarta indicated that it was prepared to provide training for Brunei security forces in a way "to contribute to the creation of a good atmosphere for political development in Brunei's independence and ASEAN membership will undoubtedly have consequences for its internal politics. The state is an absolute monarchy with power tightly held by the royal family. In many respects Brunei's government is more like that of a Persian Gulf than a Southeast Asian state. The state of emergency continues. The Legislative Council is nominated. Internal security has high police priority. Although the Sultan has become much more visible in the past two years as a reigning, modernizing monarch, it remains to be seen whether the kinds of political pressures for popular access to power, represented, for example, by the PRB, can be indefinitely resisted. There are two thousand or more Bruneians studying abroad. The non-royals are the great majority among them, and a rising political consciousness will be carried back to Brunei. Almost in anticipation of challenge, a new Internal Security Act has been promulgated that provides for preventive detention for two years renewable at the pleasure of the Sultan and not subject to appeal to any court.
Brunei's ASEAN membership will have certain consequences for the Association itself. In the first place, it will solidify the Malay-Indonesian cultural heart of ASEAN. Second, it will change Singapore's status as ASEAN's "mini-state." ASEAN's procedural pattern of site rotation of important committees may have to be altered given expected staffing problems in Brunei. Many of the administrative and technical aspects of ASEAN participation by Brunei will be solved on an ad hoc basis. This may be another argument in favor of ASEAN's structural flexibility.
Brunei is becoming independent in a Southeast Asia that continues to be an area of local-and great-power conflict. The process of integrating Brunei into ASEAN is taking place simultaneously with the ASEAN-Indochina confrontation. It is at this level of extra-ASEAN interaction that the security aspects of Brunei's membership in the Association have a regional dimension. A vulnerable Brunei will to some extent be insulated from the currents of competition through its absorption into the established pattern of ASEAN orientations, and its potential for becoming a venue for new conflict will be reduced. There are of course new risks for Brunei, but these seem more manageable for a Brunei in ASEAN than a Brunei trying to go it alone. 
